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Abstract
The current research utilized a paired-association task previously developed to evoke false
memories to determine whether people would be more likely to falsely recall having viewed
expectancy-consistent vs. expectancy-inconsistent images. Participants were shown a series of 60
expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent images and were then asked whether they
recognized 120 partially redacted images (60 previously seen, 60 new). When they reported
seeing a redacted image, they were asked which version (either the expectancy-consistent or the
expectancy-inconsistent) they remembered having seen. We found that when participants falsely
recognized redacted images, they were significantly more likely to select the expectancyconsistent version of the image. Surprisingly, we also found that accurate memories were more
likely for expectancy-consistent images. These findings suggest that this paired-association task
can be useful in evoking false memories of images.
Keywords: false memories; expectancy-inconsistent; expectancy-consistent; images;
memory
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False Memories of Expectancy-Consistent and Expectancy-Inconsistent Images in a PairedAssociation Memory Task
Because memory serves a critical role in human experience, researchers have long aimed
to better understand the multitude of ways in which our memory can fail us. One particular
research goal is understanding the phenomenon of individuals recalling events that didn’t
actually take place. Many paradigms have been developed over the years to investigate
mechanisms that may contribute to the recollection of false memories. Research has focused on
components ranging from investigator implantation of fabricated childhood memories (Loftus &
Pickrell, 1995); to thematic word lists that omit an obvious, relevant word with the intention of
causing participants to recall the omitted target word (the DRM paradigm; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995); to the influence of implicit gender stereotypes on false memories in a pairedassociation task (Macrae et al., 2002). It has been well documented in memory failure research
that false memories are more likely when consistent with the individual’s expectations, including
expectations due to held stereotypes (Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Macrae et al., 2002).
In 2002, Macrae et al. developed a novel approach using a paired-association task that
relies heavily on gender stereotypes to produce false memories. They presented participants with
a series of distinctly male and female forenames that were randomly paired with one of two
occupations: mechanic or hairdresser. After a distractor task, participants were asked whether
they recognized a series of names (combining previously viewed and new names) and, for only
the names they claimed to have recognized, whether that individual had been a mechanic or a
hairdresser. When participants remembered seeing a name that had not previously appeared, they
were more likely to state that the name was linked to its expectancy-consistent occupation, rather
than the expectancy-inconsistent occupation. For example, if the name Barbra was remembered
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despite not previously appearing, participants were more likely to identify Barbra as a hairdresser
rather than a mechanic. Moreover, when asked to select between “remembering” vs. “knowing”
(as defined by Gardiner, 1988) a name-occupation pairing, participants more frequently reported
the sensation of knowing when referencing their false memories. The authors concluded that
participants were using expectations from previous knowledge, specifically gender stereotypes,
to fill in gaps when presented with this memory task (Macrae et al., 2002).
It is worth noting that while the major finding in Macrae et al.’s 2002 paper was the
creation of stereotype-specific false memories, the researchers analyzed additional results,
including comparing the total number of accurate expectancy-consistent and accurate
expectancy-inconsistent memories. Macrae et al. found that participants tended to have better
memory for expectancy-inconsistent pairings (i.e., a masculine forename paired with
“hairdresser”). This finding aligns with a meta-analysis revealing that memory tends to be
increased for expectancy-inconsistent vs. expectancy-consistent information across 54 relevant
studies (Stangor & McMillan, 1992). These overall findings suggest that details of false
memories can be influenced by gender stereotypes (Macrae et al., 2002). Further, the results
demonstrated a valuable, underutilized paired-association task that leads to creation of truly
independent false memories, rather than false memories that are simply inaccurate details of real
memories.
A remaining question is whether expectations of visual scenes rather than word pairings
can also lead to false memories. In 1998, Miller and Gazzaniga took images with clear themes
and created false memories of schema-relevant exemplars missing from those images. For
example, an image of a beach setting was edited to remove a beach ball, an object strongly
associated with the schema of a beach. The study revealed that participants would remember
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having seen the beach ball despite only viewing a beach setting without one. Further, the authors
found that the false recall of items in themed photographs was consistently correlated with false
recall of critical lures in the DRM paradigm (Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998). However, the visual
false memories encouraged by this paradigm were limited to small additions to veridical (i.e.,
correct) memories of scenes, rather than entirely new memories (such as those found by Macrae
et al., 2002).
Miller & Gazzaniga’s work is part of a wide variety of research aimed at better
understanding how humans process visual information. Other such studies have focused on
determining the underlying factors of how people process both ordinary and unusual visual
stimuli. Researchers in this area have examined people’s responses to photographs containing
unexpected or unusual objects that don’t fit with the background. Participants tend to take longer
to recognize the unusual objects in these photos (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Davenport & Potter, 2004;
Rieger et al., 2008) and are also less accurate when doing so (Biederman, 1972). This suggests
that these images are more difficult for participants to process (Truman & Mudrik, 2018). While
much is known about the effects of scene-object congruency on object processing, the
relationship between scene-incongruent objects in an image and false memory rates remains
understudied.
The current study attempted to adjust the Macrae et al. (2002) paired-associate false
memory task to show participants expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent images—
with constancy determined by the match between an image’s background and a central object in
the foreground—rather than name/occupation pairings. We first attempted to identify whether
veridical memories (correct recognitions or ‘hits’) were higher in expectancy-consistent or
expectancy-inconsistent images using this task. We hypothesized that participants would
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recognize previously viewed, expectancy-inconsistent images with higher accuracy and that they
would also recall the correct version of previously seen expectancy-inconsistent images with
more accuracy. Finally, we hypothesized that when participants did falsely recognize partially
redacted images, they would report that the expectancy-consistent version was the version that
they saw.
Method
Participants
54 undergraduate participants (37 female, 3 transgender or nonbinary, mean age = 20.2,
SD = 2.55) at the University of Indianapolis received course credit for their participation. This
sample size was determined using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to provide 95% power for a 2tailed alpha of .5 and a medium effect size (dz = .5).
Materials
Stimuli were 120 image pairs—one expectancy-consistent version and one expectancyinconsistent version of each scene—created by Truman and Mudrik (2018), who described them
as having been designed to minimize confounding differences between matched pairs.
Specifically, these image pairs featured a background associated with easily recognizable
schematic actions such as using an oven in a kitchen or kayaking on a river. However, a central
foreground component of each image had been digitally altered to render the image expectancyinconsistent (e.g., a person putting a chessboard in the oven or paddling the kayak with a stop
sign). Each image had a complimentary expectancy-consistent version (e.g., putting a pizza in
the oven or paddling the kayak with a standard paddle) in which an expectancy-consistent object
from a different image replaced the original object. While this had no impact on the
interpretation of the consistent images, it ensured both versions of an image underwent similar
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amounts of digital editing. These images were presented using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007;
2009).
Procedure
This within-subjects experimental design utilized randomized partial counterbalancing.
The procedure loosely followed that used by Macrae et al. (2002). After giving informed
consent, participants were asked to read instructions and told to click to begin. Each participant
was exposed to 60 images (30 expectancy-consistent and 30 expectancy-inconsistent) in the first
phase of the experiment. The order of image presentation, which 60 images were selected to be
viewed in the first phase, and whether the participants saw the expectancy-consistent vs.
expectancy-inconsistent version of a given image was randomized for each participant. Each trial
began with a fixation-cross placed in the center of the screen to ensure the participants were
prepared for where the images would appear. The fixation-cross remained on the screen for 2
seconds, which was followed by presentation of an image for 2 seconds. This 2-second fixationcross/2-second image presentation was repeated until 60 randomly selected images (30
expectancy-consistent and 30 expectancy-inconsistent with randomized order appearance and
version) were presented. After completing Phase I, participants were asked to complete a
distractor task in which they named as many cities and towns from their home country as
possible in 5 minutes. After 5 minutes passed, participants clicked to begin Phase II, the second
image viewing session.
In Phase II, participants saw all 120 images, presented one at a time in random order.
These images included the same 60 images participants saw in Phase I and 60 images previously
unseen. Initial presentation of images in Phase II differed from that of Phase I in that the object
of interest (the section of the image that was digitally edited to be expectancy-consistent or
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expectancy-inconsistent) was redacted using a black rectangle superimposed on the image. The
rectangle was made to be as small as possible to ensure participants could still see a large portion
of the image. As each of the 120 images were presented, participants were asked whether they
had previously seen the image. Every time the participant responded “yes” to having previously
seen an image, they were then presented with both the expectancy-consistent and expectancyinconsistent version of the image and asked to select which version they had previously seen.
Expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent placement on the selection page was
randomized. Moreover, even in the case that participants incorrectly identified having seen an
image, they were asked to select which version they had seen. After each of the 120 redacted
images had been presented to the participants, they were thanked for their time and given credit
for their participation.
Analysis
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS (IBM Corp., 2017). Possible differences in
recognition rates were examined using paired-samples t-tests. We additionally report means and
standard deviations of total recognition for each image category, as well as 95% confidence
intervals of category differences and Cohen’s d (mean difference score/standard deviation of the
difference score).
Results
False Memories
In the case that participants incorrectly reported seeing a redacted image (i.e., they had a
memory of having seen the image despite not having seen it), they were significantly more likely
to indicate having seen the expectancy-consistent version than the expectancy-inconsistent
version. Consistent with this observation, a paired-samples t-test revealed a significant difference
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between falsely selected expectancy-consistent versions of images (M = 9.09, SD = 9.13) and
expectancy-inconsistent versions of images (M = 4.44, SD = 8.07); t(53) = 3.58, p < .001, 95%
CI = [2.05, 7.27], Cohen’s d =.49.
Veridical Memories
Participants had higher veridical source memories (or accurate version identification of
correctly recognized redacted images) for expectancy-consistent images than for images
containing an expectancy-inconsistent feature. Confirming these observations, a paired-samples
t-test revealed a significant difference between accurate memory of expectancy-consistent vs.
expectancy-inconsistent images. There was a significant difference in the total recollection
scores for expectancy-consistent images (M = 19.81, SD = 6.93) and expectancy-inconsistent
images (M = 18.24, SD = 7.03); t(53) = 3.25, p = .002, 95% CI = [.60, 2.25], Cohen’s d = .44.
Incorrect Version Selection
In the case that participants accurately recognized a redacted image, but then incorrectly
identified which version was previously seen, they were significantly more likely to have first
seen the expectancy-inconsistent version and then selected the expectancy-consistent version
than vice-versa. A paired-samples t-test revealed a significant difference between incorrectly
selecting the expectancy-inconsistent version of an image (M = 1.33, SD = 2.40) and incorrectly
selecting the expectancy-consistent version of an image (M = 2.35, SD = 2.99); t(53) = 2.78, p =
.007, 95% CI = [.28, 1.75], Cohen’s d =.38.
Discussion
The goal of the current research was to explore the possibility of modifying Macrae et
al.’s (2002) paired-association false memory task to test participants’ memories of expectancyconsistent and expectancy-inconsistent images. It was hypothesized that participants would tend
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to better remember expectancy-inconsistent images while indicating expectancy-consistent
images when they had false memories of seeing images they had not previously seen. Results
indicated that while false memories did lead to the selection of expectancy-consistent images,
participants had an unexpected tendency towards selecting the expectancy-consistent images in
both accurate recognition + accurate version selection and in accurate recognition + incorrect
version selection.
False Memories
The main goal of this experiment was to explore the possibility of adjusting Macrae et
al.’s (2002) paired-association task to create false memories of expectancy-consistent and
expectancy-inconsistent scenes in images. Findings were in alignment with the hypothesis that
when participants incorrectly recognized redacted versions of images they had not previously
seen, they would be significantly more likely to select the expectancy-consistent version of the
image than the expectancy-inconsistent version. This finding corresponds with Macrae et al.’s
(2002) results and suggests that this paired-association task is effective at eliciting false
memories of images. Further, the task does tend to lead participants to having false memories of
having seen expectancy-consistent vs. expectancy-inconsistent versions of images.
Accurate Memories and Partially-Accurate Memories
Current findings regarding correct recognition of previously attended items diverged
from Macrae et al.’s (2002) findings. Participants in the current study were more accurate at
identifying the correct version of images when the images were expectancy-consistent. In
addition, participants were more likely to incorrectly select the expectancy-consistent version of
an image after correctly recognizing having seen the image, thus revealing an overall preference
for the expectancy-consistent photos when asked to select between the two.
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The differences between Macrae et al.’s (2002) findings and ours could have several
causes. First, there is neurological evidence to suggest that individuals process expectancyconsistent and expectancy-inconsistent images differently (Truman & Mudrik, 2018); it is also
possible that expectedness determinations for visual scenes are made via a mechanism
independent of the mechanism responsible for expectedness determinations of Macrae et al.’s
(2002) word pairs. Determining whether this is the case is a potential avenue for future research.
Further, the fact that the current study evaluated expectancy-consistent and expectancyinconsistent images of scenes is far more in line with schema activation and less in line with
stereotype activation. The current findings are consistent with the early cognitive schema
literature, which suggested that expectancy-consistent information would be remembered better
than expectancy-inconsistent information, which differs from the findings generally seen in trait
and stereotype research within social psychology (Heider et al., 2005). Another explanation is
that participants who were observing expectancy-consistent images may have put more effort
into examining those images to search for a nonexistent inconsistent object within them, thus
increasing veridical memories of expectancy-consistent images.
Conclusion
In addition to expanding the usefulness of this paired-association false memory task,
these findings could be especially valuable to researchers who are trying to better understand
how humans process and remember different types of visual scenes containing ordinary and
unusual objects. Future work using neuroimaging techniques to investigate whether expectancy
determinations for visual scenes and word pairs are made using similar or distinct neural systems
could help to explain our findings, as well as help flesh out theories of false-memory formation
to account for different modalities.
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